A SHORT REVIEW OF PASAY RTC BRANCH 111 CASE:LRC CIVIL CASE No. 3957-P and Relative Decisions concerning the Tallanos, Acopiados, and Acops..

THE INFAMOUS DECEPTION AND FAKERY

      ON December 11, 2009, the Court of Appeals, acting on two cases pending before them, one of which was filed by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, came out with the DECISION, the dispositive portion of the aforesaid CA Decision which states:

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            "WHEREFORE, premises considered, We render judgment as follows:

      As to CA-G.R. SP No. 70014:

(1) The reconstitution proceedings in LRC/ Civil Case No. 3957-P in respondent Court are DECLARED VOID for lack of jurisdiction.

(2) The following decisions/ orders/ writ/ and other documents are ANNULLED and DECLARED VOID and of no force and effect:

a. Decision With Compromise Agreement dated February 4, 1972233 consisting of 139 pages;

b. Clarificatory Order dated March 21, 1974 consisting of 30 pages;

c. Decision dated November 4, 1975235 consisting of 44 pages;

d. Clarificatory Decision dated January 19, 1976 consisting of 60 pages;

e. Entry of Judgment dated June 14, 1972 consisting of 7/ 6 pages;

f. Writ of Execution, Demolition and Possession dated September 10, 1974238 consisting of 14 pages;

g. Certificate of Sheriff’s Return dated November 17, 1974;

h. Letters of Administration dated July 7, 1976;

i. Certified True Photocopy of Judicial Form No. 140, G.L.R.O. Form No. 68, Book No. 34 of TCT No. T-408 consisting of 7 pages;

j. Certified True Photocopy of TCT No. T-498242 consisting of 7 pages;

k. Order of Third Alias Writ of Execution, Possession and Demolition dated May 28, 1989243 consisting of 55 pages;

l. Order dated July 7, 1997;

m.Order dated July 11, 2001; and

n. Order dated October 8, 2001.

(3) TCT No. T-408 and TCT No. T-498, which were reconstituted pursuant to the Order dated July 11,

2001, are DECLARED VOID. Accordingly, the Registers of Deeds of the Provinces of Rizal and Bulacan (in Guiguinto, Bulacan) are DIRECTED to CANCEL TCT No. T-408 and TCT No. T-498.

(4) The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on June 25, 2002 is made PERMANENT.

(5) The heirs, agents, privies, or anyone acting for and in behalf of JM Tallano, AM Acopiado and AM Acop are ENJOINED from representing or exercising any acts of possession/ ownership or from disposing in any manner, portions of the land covered by alleged TCT No. 408, TCT No. T-408, and TCT No. T- 498.

      As to CA-G.R. SP No. 104604:

(6) Respondents Manila International Airport Authority, Land Transportation Office and Pasay City Government are declared NOT GUILTY of indirect contempt. Consequently, the petition for indirect contempt against them is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

      SO ORDERED.

                                                                     MAGDANGAL M. DE LEON

                                                                                   Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HAKIM S. ABDULWAHID    ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

              Associate Justice                                                  Associate Justice 

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THE TRUE FACTS ON THE CASE:

1) The case at Pasay RTC Branch 111 was never about the Tallanos, Acopiados or Acops.  It was a Reconveyance and Reconstitution Petition filed by a certain WILSON ORFINADA against MACARIO  RODRIGUEZ.  The Petition, filed sometime in 1973, alleges that WILSON ORFINADA was able to secure a Deed of Absolute Sale from Macario Rodriguez for all the properties that the Rodriguezes owned, especially in the Province of Rizal and Manila.  Sometime in 1974, Mr. HENRY F. RODRIGUEZ, grandson of the late Macario Rodriguez, filed a criminal case against Wilson Orfinada for falsifying public documents and forging the signature of his grandfather Macario Rodriguez on the fake deed of sale.  For this, Mr. Wilson Orfinada went into hiding abroad and was not able to pursue the above mentioned Reconstitution case.  In fact, the case files, along with the other files from the Hall of Justice in Pasay City was burned by an extensive fire that wiped out the entire Court documents in the Offices of the Hall of Justice of Pasay City.  NONE OF THE TALLANOS, ACOPIADOS OR ACOPS were ever able to file any intervention on the above titled case, and that the entire Pasay RTC records that were alleged to have been reconstituted by the Pasay City RTC Court were all falsely manufactured by the alleged intervenors, they being the culprit themselves.  In fact, the Acopiados who used to show a fake deed of sale from Don Hermogenes Rodriguez to the alleged Don Anacleto Figueroa Acopiado is also a fake considering that the alleged Deed of Sale (or any deed of sale from Don Hermogenes Rodriguez for that matter) were signed sometime in 1913 and was notarized ten years later, in 1923, considering Don Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes died intestate in the year 1910 (see rollo 68, page 3 Decision April 27, 1999, Special Proceedings No. IR-1110).  To further expound on this, the Acopiados were never related to the Madrigals, for in truth the "M" in their middle name stands for MONTANEZ and NOT MADRIGAL!  We would like to cite to you the findings of the Supreme Court concerning the Roberto Acopiado claim, the Resolution of the Supreme Court discussing the Petition in intervention filed by the Acopiados:

(READ FOR YOURSELVES FROM A CERTIFIED FAITHFULLY REPRODUCED PHOTOCOPY OF THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION GR No.162704 DATED APRIL 6, 2005, THE SUPREME COURT'S DENIAL OF ROBERTO ACOPIADO'S INTERVENTION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION BEING CALLED TO TASK BY THE HIGHEST COURT OF THE LAND TO STUDY THE FAKE COURT DOCUMENTS & TITLE  FOR FILING OF CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST THE INTERVENOR ROBERTO P. ACOPIADO AND HIS REPRESENTATIVES)

   

         

               

         Now, is this very obvious?  We do not need to comment or act anymore, for the Supreme Court and the Judicial hierarchy had already done what needed to be done, with all due respect to the Department of Justice and the National Bureau of Investigation. While the true Hermogenes Rodriguez and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes heirs did not speak a single word against the government for unfairly clustering the true Estate with the false ones, the Estate has already quietly proven through the Honorable Courts that plain truth is with the true estate.

(This writer's Note:  For a more extensive reading of the decision and outcome of the case with the official website of the Courts, please check the Court of Appeals website and type http://ca.judiciary.gov.ph/cardis/SP70014.pdf...rbg54)

RTC JUDGE DISMISSED FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW IN MODIFYING A LONG FINAL AND EXECUTORY ORDER

JUDGE PAMINTUAN OF RTC BRANCH 3, BAGUIO CITY DISMISSED FROM SERVICE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW

VITAL EXCERPTS OF THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062

Per Curiam:

         

The judiciary cannot keep those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. This being so, in the performance of the functions of their office, judges must endeavor to act in a manner that puts them and their conduct above reproach and beyond suspicion.  They must act with extreme care for their office indeed is burdened with a heavy load of responsibility.

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From the records, it appears that on November 15, 2006, Marcos  filed a complaint-affidavit charging Judge Pamintuan with Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu proprio the final and executory order of then Acting Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes (Judge Reyes) dated May 30, 1996 (and modified in the September 2, 1996 order), in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled “Albert D. Umali, in his capacity as the exclusive administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters Association of the Philippines v. Jose D. Roxas, et al.”

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            Marcos averred that the act of Judge Pamintuan in reversing a final and executory order constituted gross ignorance of the law.  In her complaint, citing A.M. No. 93-7-696-0, she argued that final and executory judgments of lower courts were not reviewable even by the Supreme Court.  Judge Pamintuan reversed a final and executory order not upon the instance of any of the parties in Civil Case No. 3383-R but motu proprio.  He even failed to indicate where he obtained the information that the Golden Buddha sitting in his sala was a “mere replica.”  Marcos claimed that his order was in conflict with Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a judgment or final order shall state “clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it (his order) is based xxx.”

In its Report, dated June 29, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Pamintuan be dismissed from the service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service, including government owned or controlled corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and for “violation of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.”  The OCA pointed out that: 

            As held, execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law.  A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party.   Bearing this in mind, respondent issued the questioned Order dated August 15, 2006, the pertinent text of which reads:

            Despite said Order which was issued almost ten (10) years ago, the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas has not taken possession of the Buddha Statuette or the Buddha replica from the Court, thus, this incumbent Presiding Judge, seeing the necessity of finally disposing of the Buddha Statuette physically, and finding out the present statue of the late Rogelio Roxas, ordered the hearing on June 29, 2006.  (Italics supplied)

                        xxx                  xxx                  xxx

WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated September 2, 1996, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas.  However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estate’s administrator.

            Clearly, the questioned Order conforms to the directive of the Court in its previous Order dated May 30, 1996, which provides:

It is further ORDERED that the Buddha Statuette in custody of this Court be immediately RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry Roxas and Gervic Roxas and to the decedent’s brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.

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And modified in an Order dated September 2, 1996, which reads:

                    “WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General is DENIED.  The Order of this Court on May 30, 1996 remains insofar as the Buddha statuette is awarded to the state of the late Rogelio Roxas and is at the same time MODIFIED in the sense that the Buddha statuette shall be under the custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas or upon the appointment of his estate’s administrator.”

x x x                x x x                x x x

 A normal course of proceedings would have been that respondent Judge waits for the proper party to go to court to ask for the release of the Buddha statuette. x x x.

However, respondent was being overzealous when he ruled that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a “fake one, or a mere replica.”  Notwithstanding that the same may be his’ and the litigants’ opinion during the hearing of June 29, 2006. (sic)  He should have borne in mind that there were no issues nor controversies left for consideration (in Civil Case No. 3383-R).  It must be noted that the Order dated May 30, 1996 (and modified on September 2, 1996) has become final and executory.  Hence, issues have been settled and the matter laid to rest.  As repeatedly ruled by this Court, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable.  A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law.  Should judgment of lower courts – which may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals – become final and executory before, or without exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they too become inviolable, impervious to modification.  They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of government.

It is inexcusable for respondent Judge to have overlooked such an elementary legal principle.”

XXX

After a thorough study of the case, the Court (Supreme Court) agrees with the evaluation and recommendation of the OCA.

Doubtless, the May 30, 1996 Order, which was modified on September 2, 1996, in Civil Case No. 3383-R, has long become final and executory.  In his assailed August 15, 2006 Order, Judge Pamintuan made express declarations that were not embodied either in the May 30, 1996 Order or in the September 2, 1996 Order.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

SECTION 6.  Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

Judge Pamintuan indeed made a serious error in making such a pronouncement in the challenged order.

It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to wit: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.

 It is inexcusable for Judge Pamintuan to have overlooked such basic legal principle no matter how noble his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to the public to be well-informed, thus, they are expected to be familiar with the statutes and procedural rules at all times.  When the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

The Court agrees with the view of OCA that Judge Pamintuan manifested gross ignorance of the law in issuing the questioned August 15, 2006 Order. Verily, he failed to conform to the high standards of competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that:

     Rule 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.

Rule 3.01 - A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.

Competence is a mark of a good judge.  When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know-how with the rules or with settled jurisprudence, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly crucial that judges be acquainted with the law and basic legal principles. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one - not even judges.

WRITER'S NOTE:  IT IS THE PERSONAL OPINION OF THIS WRITER THAT THIS CASE CITATION IS LIKE OR VERY SIMILAR TO THE ACTIONS THAT WERE TAKEN BY THE PREVIOUS JUDGE WHO ISSUED THE FEBRUARY 21, 2007 ORDER OF THE RTC COURT BRANCH 34, IRIGA CITY, IN THE RODRIGUEZ INTESTATE CASE, WHEN SHE USED AS BASIS AN ERRONEOUS COURT OF APPEALS DECISION WHICH HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE RTC CASE, AND IN THE ISSUANCE OF SUCH ORDER, REVERSED AND MODIFIED AN ALREADY LONG FINAL AND EXECUTORY "AMENDED DECISION" WHICH WAS ALREADY UPHELD IN AT LEAST TWO SUPREME COURT RESOLUTIONS WITH ENTRY OF JUDGMENTS BY THE TIME THE COURT OF APPEALS ISSUED A RESOLUTION OF ITS OWN NULLIFYING THE SAID AMENDED DECISION.  PROOF OF THIS IS THE DECEMBER 4, 2009 SUPREME COURT DECISION IN G.R. No.182645 WHICH NULLIFIED THE AFORESAID FEBRUARY 21, 2007 RTC ORDER AND THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLUTION.  - rbg54

DECEMBER 4, 2009 SUPREME COURT RULING IN THE INTESTATE CASE OF HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ CITED CASE IN REMEDIAL LAW

Special Proceedings No. IR-1110 Reinstated by Supreme Court G.R. No.182645 December 4, 2009 now a Jurisprudence(SCRA Vol.607p.770-777) Citation in Remedial Law

(Refer to http://lexoterica.wordpress.com/2010/01/29/december-2009-philippine-supreme-court-decisions-on-remedial-law/)

Appeal on the Settlement of Estate 

      "In special proceedings, such as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. . . . The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal being perfected, the decision or order becomes final, thus: xxx xxx xxx In the case under consideration, it was on 13 August 1999 that the RTC issued an Amended Decision. On 12 October 1999, Jaime Robles erroneously filed a notice of appeal instead of filing a record on appeal. The RTC, in an order dated 22 November 1999, denied this for his failure to file a record on appeal as required by the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of the rule; hence, the 13 August 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC lapsed into finality. It was therefore an error for the Court of Appeals to entertain the case knowing that Jaime Robles’ appeal was not perfected and had lapsed into finality." 
      In the matter of the Heirship [Intestate Estates] of the late Hermogenes Rodriguez, et al., Rene B. Pascual vs. Jaime M. Robles,G.R. No. 182645, December 4, 2009.

Perfection of Appeal 

      "This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.  The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.  The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.  The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirement of the rules.  Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice. Public policy and sound practice demand that judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions.  Thus, we have held that the failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed reglementary period is not a mere technicality, but jurisdictional. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision. Failure to meet the requirements of an appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain any appeal. There are exceptions to this rule, unfortunately respondents did not present any circumstances that would justify the relaxation of said rule." 

      In the matter of the Heirship [Intestate Estates] of the late Hermogenes Rodriguez, et al., Rene B. Pascual vs. Jaime M. Robles, G.R. No. 182645, December 4, 2009.

(Both citations in Remedial Law were published by Lexoterica Blawg - rbg54).

 

LOOMING SCENARIO FOR REFUSAL TO EXECUTE A FINAL & EXECUTORY JUDGMENT...

A Cited Case for Gross Ignorance of the Law

ON A MAGISTRATE / JUDGE WHO REFUSES TO EXECUTE FINAL JUDGMENT:

       "Complainant filed a case against Judge Patricio accusing him of gross ignorance of the law, manifest bias and partiality for refusing to execute a judgment which was already final and executory. The rule is that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Judge (Patricio)  demonstrated ignorance of such rule by repeatedly refusing to execute the final and executory judgment (of conviction against the accused.) 

     The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know how to apply them or to be confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In other words, a judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and supervise implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment. Judge (Patricio’s) acts unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law." 

Jesus D. Carbajosa v. Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas, Capiz, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834, October 2, 2013.

(Credits to LEXOTERICA BLAWG on the information - rbg54)

RTC ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE ISSUES ORDER EXPUNGING NO. IR-1110 TO COMPLY WITH ERRONEOUS CA DECISION G.R. SP57417 WHICH HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE RTC SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE, BUT REVERSED AND NULLIFIED BY THE SUPREME COURT G.R. No.182645 DECEMBER 4, 2009, REINSTATING AMENDED DECISION

       On February 14, 2007, Judge Lore V. Bagalacsa, on the strength of Supreme Administrative Circular 5-98 as ordered and endorsed by then Pairing Judge Alfredo Agawa, issued an Order in the case she decided entitled "Special Proceedings No. IR-1110", the dispositive portion of the Order which states:

        

        xxx"As stated by the Supreme Court in a long line of cases, once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes IMMUTABLE and UNALTERABLE.  The Court(RTC), in the absence of any supervening events, cannot grant the relief prayed for by the Solicitor General or any of the oppositors in this case, as to do so will undeniably modify and alter the AMENDED DECISION which has long become FINAL and EXECUTORY.  Moreover, the Solicitor General's standing in Court has been passed upon by this Court(RTC) in the AMENDED DECISION where he was declared to be not a real party in the proceedings, with more reason that the Solicitor General has no personality to continuously and repeatedly file various motions, comments, objections or opposition.

   

         It bears stressing that the AMENDED DECISION in this case (Special Proceedings No. IR-1110) already became FINAL and EXECUTORY several years ago.  Once a judgment becomes final and executory it can no longer be disturbed except only for the correction of clerical errors, or where supervening events render its execution impossible or unjust(Sampaguita Garments Corporation v. NLRC, 233 SCRA 260).  The Court(RTC) will no longer pass upon the other arguments raised by the Solicitor General in view of the above pronouncements.

        WHEREFORE, the motions and comments filed by the Solicitor General are DENIED for lack of merit.

        SO ORDERED." 

      On February 21, 2007, barely three days upon assumption as Acting Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 34, Iriga City, the Hon. Judge Lelu Contreras issued an Order motu proprio, expunging the entire THIRTY EIGHT (38) VOLUMES of records of Special Proceedings No. IR-1110 on the basis of the April 16, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals CA G.R. No. SP57417, an ERRONEOUS ruling which had no jurisdiction at all over the Amended Decision of this Hon. Court.  The Order of Judge Lelu Contreras contravened, reversed and vacated this Honorable Court’s Amended Decision, Certificate of Finality, and the February 14, 2007 Order, all issued by a co-equal magistrate who decided this case.  Worse, the said February 21, 2007 Order of the Hon. Judge Contreras had, in effect, grossly ignored the two (2) Supreme Court Resolutions with Entries of Judgments in SC G.R. No.140271 and SC G.R. No.142477 dated February 22, 2000 and September 5, 2000 respectively, the said Order being against the established principle of the hierarchy of Courts under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph (2) sub-paragraph (c) and (e) of the Constitution, which declares:

“The SUPREME COURT shall have the following powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

xxx
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;

    xxx
     (e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.”

        On December 4, 2009, the Supreme Court, in a PETITION FOR CLARIFICATION and CERTIORARI in SC-G.R. No. 182645, promulgated a DECISION based on the merits of the case, the dispositive portion of which specifically states:

          

        “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.  The 16 April 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57417 and the February 27, 2007 (should be February 21, 2007) Order of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 34 are hereby NULLIFIED.  The 13 August 1999 Amended Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City in SP No. IR-1110 is hereby REINSTATED.(607 SCRA p.770-777, December 4, 2009)

        On June 22, 2011, the Supreme Court, before dismissing the case of SC petitioner Rene Pascual on the same case, discussed separately the RTC Iriga City AMENDED DECISION, and declared:

  "THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON THE IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS are: (1) CLERICAL ERRORS, (2)THE SO-CALLED NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRIES WHICH CAUSE NO PREJUDICE TO ANY PARTY, and (3)VOID JUDGMENTS.xxx"  

      UNLIKE THE AUGUST 13, 1999 AMENDED DECISION OF THE RTC IRIGA CITY, BRANCH 34, (which was found by the CA to be a complete nullity), THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE INSTANT CASE (Special Proceedings No. IR-1110) FALLS UNDER ANY OF THE EXCEPTIONS ENUMERATED ABOVE." 

       Worthy also to note is the last paragraph before the dismissal of the Certiorari case of Rene Pascual, with the Supreme Court ruling that it is now "with prejudice" for Rene Pascual, Jaime Robles, the OSG, or any other party to bring to petition for appeal and question the finality and immutability of the Amended Decision, (as opposed to the CA Decision being a void judgment and was nullified together with the February 21, 2007 Order of Judge Lelu Contreras), the Supreme Court stating firmly:

  "CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING (after discussing the immutability of the AMENDED DECISION), THE COURT NO LONGER FINDS IT NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER." 


          THERE IS NO OTHER RECOURSE FOR THE HONORABLE MAGISTRATE OF THE RTC BRANCH 34 OF IRIGA CITY BUT TO IMPLEMENT THE LONG DELAYED EXECUTION OF THE AMENDED DECISION. 

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FOR TWO LAWS/DECISIONS PASSED/PROMULGATED ON THE SAME ISSUE/SUBJECT MATTER

 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ON THE DECEMBER 4, 2009 AND JUNE 22, 2011 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS OF G.R. No.182645 - IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ vs. JAIME ROBLES:

          The June 22, 2011 Supreme Court Decision of SC-G.R. No. 182645 issued by the Special Third Division, in dismissing the petition for Certiorari filed by Supreme Court petitioner Rene Pascual, a non-party to the original case in RTC Branch 34, Iriga City, did not affect at all the finality and Immutability of the AMENDED DECISION dated August 13, 1999 of Special Proceedings in IR-1110.  Anent this, the Supreme Court December 4, 2009 Decision of the same case, issued by the former Regular Third Division and which was penned by now retired Hon. Justice Minita Chico-Nazario, and which was set aside by the December 15, 2010 Resolution of the Special Third Division, but the aforesaid late appeal PARTLY GRANTED and only meant to give SC Respondent Jaime Robles a chance to enter his plea and speak out as an indispensible party, but the aforesaid June 22, 2011 SC Decision NEVER PRONOUNCED AND RULED AGAINST the Iriga City AMENDED DECISION nor the December 4, 2009 SC DECISION, the latter already attaining FINALITY and became part of jurisprudence as borne by the annotated records in SCRA Vol. 607, p.770-777, and the same was never pronounced as having been reversed, nullified or vacated by the June 22, 2011 SC Special Third Division Decision.  It is constitutionally illegal for a (Special) DIVISION of the SUPREME COURT to nullify, reverse or vacate a Decision of another (Regular) DIVISION of the SUPREME COURT when the said Decision of the latter Division had already lapsed into finality; this was specified by the Constitutional provisions of our basic law but can only be done through an EN BANC ruling by the SUPREME COURT voting as one body by all fifteen (15) members of the Highest Magistrate.  The Constitutional provision in Article VIII, Section 4, last portion of paragraph 3 authoritatively directs the entire Judiciary Department of the country that in the presence of conflicting rulings, only an EN BANC decision by the highest Court shall have the final say, stating inter alia-

          “xxx Provided: THAT NO DOCTRINE OR PRINCIPLE OF LAW  LAID DOWN BY THE COURT IN A DECISION RENDERED EN BANC OR IN DIVISION MAY BE MODIFIED OR REVERSED EXCEPT BY THE COURT (SUPREME COURT) SITTING EN BANC. xxx.” 

        The Supreme Court, in the aforesaid case SC-G.R. No. 182645, issued the following rulings in two Decisions, as follows:

I. THE DECEMBER 4, 2009 SC DECISION (SCRA 607, p.770-777)

GRANTED THE PETITION FOR CLARIFICATION BEING MERITORIOUS, THE SUPREME COURT DISPOSITIVELY RULING IN REGARD TO THE CA RESOLUTION/DECISION AND, THE RTC AMENDED DECISION:

1) NULLIFIED the COURT OF APPEALS DECISION G.R. SP No. 57417 dated April 16, 2002, which had previously declared the RTC Branch 34 Iriga City AMENDED DECISION  a patent nullity. Relative to the CA Resolution nullification, the Supreme Court also NULLIFIED the February 21, 2007 RTC Iriga City Order which continued to implement the void CA Resolution; and

2) REINSTATED the RTC Iriga City AMENDED DECISION dated August 13, 1999 of aforesaid Special Proceedings No. IR-1110, the said RTC Decision having COMMITTED NO ERRORS. 

II. THE JUNE 22, 2011 SC DECISION

THE SUPREME COURT DISPOSITIVELY DISCUSSED TWO SEPARATE RULINGS:

1) Declared "IMMUTABLE" the LONG DECLARED FINAL & EXECUTORY RTC Branch 34 Iriga City AMENDED DECISION, the Supreme Court categorically discussed the following:

  xxx"The ONLY EXEMPTIONS TO THE RULE OF IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS ARE: (1)THE CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS, (2)THE SO CALLED NUNC-PRO-TUNC ENTRIES WHICH CAUSE NO PREJUDICE TO ANY PARTY, AND (3)VOID JUDGMENTS.

     UNLIKE THE AMENDED DECISION, (which was found by the CA to be a complete nullity), THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE INSTANT CASE (Special Proceedings No. IR-1110) FALLS UNDER ANY OF THE EXCEPTIONS ENUMERATED ABOVE."

2) Dismissed the Petition for Certiorari of Rene Pascual ON A TECHNICALITY, since RENE PASCUAL was NOT AN ORIGINAL PARTY TO THE RTC Iriga City SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE. 

       
   By way of STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, the two SUPREME COURT DECISIONS of December 4, 2009 and June 22, 2011, of SC G.R. No. 182645, not contradictory in their pronouncements, are both given equal weight and importance, and both rulings are applied by the Supreme Court without conflict.  On both Supreme Court Decisions, the RTC Branch 34 Iriga City AMENDED DECISION was upheld when it was REINSTATED, and, being a final and executory judgment a long time ago, having committed no errors, and was declared IMMUTABLE; as against the CA Resolution dated 16 April 2002 in CA G.R. SP No.57417, which CAN NEVER BECOME IMMUTABLE and was categorized as a VOID JUDGMENT, the said CA ruling NULLIFIED by the Supreme Court in the December 4, 2009 Decision of SC-G.R. No. 182645.

          The Supreme Court in the Decision dated December 4, 2009 and  then in the Decision dated June 22, 2011 in SC-G.R. No. 182645 have now both become final and executory, and the Supreme Court issued an Entry of Judgment on September 12, 2011 for the said case, and was duly transmitted by registered mail, as per records of the Supreme Court Judgment Division, to the Court of Appeals and RTC Branch 34 of Iriga City on December 9, 2011.

(As per research, Statutory Construction is a three(3) unit subject, in law schools.  This is usually the study and analysis of old and new decisions or laws passed covering the same issues or subject. - Credit to AE on his explanation on this - rbg54.)